2 day carrying with LTCH. +.5 Conservation Officer

[Hammerhead]

They may have agreed with the trial court, however they added in the specific wording above what the trial court concluded because it was an appeal. The trial court found Richardson in the wrong. The INSC found the officer in the wrong. That's the difference.

The INSC did word it in such a way to agree that the seat belt law limits the actions an officer can take because it is in itself restrictive for that very purpose. When she inquired about the bulge and he cooperated and provided his LTCH, she had the right to validate it. She didn't do it properly (either by not doing the math, or making triple sure that someone on the other end of the radio was giving her good info, which they didn't) and she felt that because there was *some* doubt, she had the right to remove him and search him and his vehicle.

The SC said this was the reason the search and subsequent discovery was illegal. She didn't have PC or RAS after the valid LTCH was presented, because it was valid at the time. He admitted he was pocket carrying. With his LTCH, there's no crime.

It's not just that they said the LTCH stopped any inquiry, in this specific case, they said that these events were the specific reason why presenting a LTCH stops inquiry.

She may have gone above and beyond what the seat belt law allows, but she kept fishing and pushing, and the INSC decided that the LTCH is enough to stop that fishing.

I'm certain that it may not change the behavior of people or officers, at least not initially. They'll still ask and people will still let them. I'm thinking that there will probably need to be at least one, if not more, cases where officers overstep what the INSC has described here, i.e. the inquiry after LTCH is presented, coupled with the new IC on local ordinance (and/or personal opinions) enforcement to make it specific.

It's still a starting point, and for carriers who have official interactions with police, it tells them that they don't have to inform, and it reinforces our 4A rights.

 

[Indy317]

They may have agreed with the trial court, however they added in the specific wording above what the trial court concluded because it was an appeal. The trial court found Richardson in the wrong. The INSC found the officer in the wrong. That's the difference.

No wonder your way off in what the Richardson ruling means, you either aren't reading the same ruling, or your making things up to suit your opinion. In the one I'm reading, the trial court found the officer in the wrong, not Richardson. The state appealed and the state appeals court ruled the officer was OK in inquiring under the restrictions of the Act. Richardson appealed that ruling and the INSC sided with the trial court's original ruling, that asking about the bulge was outside the scope because the entire detainment was based on Indiana's Seat Belt Enforcement Act.

She may have gone above and beyond what the seat belt law allows, but she kept fishing and pushing, and the INSC decided that the LTCH is enough to stop that fishing.

Wrong again. They ruled that due to the type of detainment, the mere asking was improper. They also pointed out that even with a seat belt stop it maybe OK to inquire about weapons, but there are limits: "In Trigg v. State, 725 N.E.2d 446, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), the Court of Appeals interpreted Baldwin to allow for a limited search for weapons when an officer makes a traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion that a seat belt violation has occurred. However, the Court said that a limited search for weapons must be “the result of actions or behavior on the part of the defendant after the initial stop that led a police officer to fear for his safety.”"

In this case, the officer testified that there was no actions that made her fear for her safety. As such, there was no reason to even ask the question, given the restrictions by the seat belt act. The court also wrote: "On these facts, we agree with the trial court that Officer Eastwood‟s questioning about the “unusual bulge” contravened the Act." as well as "And even if the facts were such that Officer Eastwood‟s questioning about the bulge was proper..." before even discussing the issue of having the license.

I'm thinking that there will probably need to be at least one, if not more, cases where officers overstep what the INSC has described here, i.e. the inquiry after LTCH is presented, coupled with the new IC on local ordinance (and/or personal opinions) enforcement to make it specific.

I'm not sure if they will hold the same standard given another crime or infraction. They somewhat alluded to this: "The State relies on our decision in State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1207-08 (Ind. 2008), to contend that Officer East-wood‟s inquiry was entirely proper because under Section 11, an officer may ask a motorist whether he or she has weapon on his person. However, Washington did not involve a seat belt stop; the defendant was stopped for, inter alia, repeatedly driving a moped left of center."

Eventually we will see a case involving someone running a stop sign or speeding and similar factors will come into play. It will be interesting to see how the court rules then.

 

[Hammerhead]

I will admit that it has been a while since I've read through the whole ruling. However, this does not negate the fact that the court specifically said:

There will, of course, be circumstances where something more than an “unusual bulge” will be visible, or other conditions that provide a police officer with the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct further inquiry. This is not one of them. And even if the facts were such that Officer Eastwood's questioning about the bulge was proper, the fact remains that Richardson's production of a valid gun permit should have resulted in the termination of any further questioning.

There are several paragraphs above this one in the ruling that discuss the "above and beyond" the seatbelt act that state how the officer shouldn't have been asking about the bulge. There were several reasons, namely because he wasn't, and hadn't had a history of, being belligerent or violent with her, and had previously and was currently cooperating with her. They discuss all the cases that provide precedent.

However, that last line clearly states that even if the circumstances that allow her to ask are present, the presentation of a valid LTCH ends any further inquiry. This is worded in such a way that specifically defines a valid LTCH as the end of the conversation about firearms and not just because of the seatbelt act.

 

[Indy317]

However, that last line clearly states that even if the circumstances that allow her to ask are present, the presentation of a valid LTCH ends any further inquiry. This is worded in such a way that specifically defines a valid LTCH as the end of the conversation about firearms and not just because of the seatbelt act.

This issue with showing the license and that being the end of it is married to the restrictions set out in the seat belt enforcement act. It might help someone down the road, but for now, this is in no way a slam dunk that in any other incident the court will rule the same. The entire issue here was that the act fully allows officers to do what is needed if there is a clear cut safety issue. In this case there wasn't so the restritions of the act apply. This ruling does nothing in terms of other civil or criminal actions until the court specifically rules on such.

 

[Hammerhead]

No, it's not. You're interpreting it as such, but you have to take the emboldened part I quoted with the first line of that paragraph where they say that there will be times when it will be ok to inquire further outside of the seatbelt act.

They also state clearly that "This is not one of them." This statement is defining the whole case against Richardson specifically under the seatbelt act, furthering the previous paragraphs about the seatbelt act. They are making it absolutely clear that their decision is because of the seatbelt act in this specific case.

The emboldened part is saying that if they weren't ruling specifically for Mr. Richardson because of the seatbelt act, the LTCH is still reason enough that further inquiry stops.

Yes, Richardson was ruled because of the seatbelt act. They still made it clear that outside of a case tied to the seatbelt act, the LTCH stops further inquiry with the last paragraph I quoted.

 

[bullet]

I have a great deal of respect for our law inforcment also. I think they do a very dangerous and most often thankless job. But I still would tell them I had a gun in the car, even though it's legal.

If they asked I wouldn't lie, but I've never been asked.

 

[Indy317]

No, it's not. You're interpreting it as such, but you have to take the emboldened part I quoted with the first line of that paragraph where they say that there will be times when it will be ok to inquire further outside of the seatbelt act.

You have to take the entire case as a whole. It is complete married to the seat belt enforcement act until we get another ruling stating otherwise.

They also state clearly that "This is not one of them."

It wasn't one of them because they guy wasn't a threat. Are you saying that had the officer perceived some sort of threat, the mere showing of the license wouldn't have mattered?

Everything in this case is connected, no one part can be separated:
-Restrictions in seat belt enforcement act
-The guy wasn't a danger to the officer
-The showing of the license should have ceased further inquire, but this is especially the case given the restrictions placed on LE by the underlying law used to detain the man.

Yes, Richardson was ruled because of the seatbelt act. They still made it clear that outside of a case tied to the seatbelt act, the LTCH stops further inquiry with the last paragraph I quoted.

Do you have that in writing from one of the judges? I didn't see where they made it crystal clear this applies to all legal detainment. I read that as they are saying that since there was no threatening behavior and the LEO was under restrictions of the underlying law she was enforcing, the license: #1: Should have never been asked for and #2: Should have definitely ended it right there because of the underlying restrictions.

 

[Hammerhead]

You're reading too much into that paragraph, or you're trying to read between the lines.

There will be times that asking about a "bulge" or something else is acceptable during a professional encounter. This case wasn't one of them. But if it was, the LTCH is enough to stop further inquiry.

I do have it in writing, because that's exactly what they are saying in the finding. The seatbelt act restricts you. It restricted that officer. They're acknowledging that. They're also saying that encounters outside of stops involving the seatbelt act that the LTCH is enough to stop inquiry into firearms.

If a person was a danger (Define that, belligerent? Having a bad day? Angry?) that there would be other circumstances that would meet the PC or RAS for anything further beyond just being shown a LTCH. Escalation beyond "normal" of course would merit something beyond just the LTCH inquiry.

Not every encounter will have that. If you pull me over for a burnt out headlight (or any other infraction not related to the seatbelt act), and I have a civil discussion with you, and you see my firearm, you can ask for my LTCH. When I provide it, the discussion is over. This scenario has nothing to do with the seatbelt act, and the INSC had this in mind when they wrote that paragraph.

-The showing of the license should have ceased further inquire [sic], but this is especially the case given the restrictions placed on LE by the underlying law used to detain the man.

You make my point for me.

 

[Indy317]

You're reading too much into that paragraph, or you're trying to read between the lines.

There will be times that asking about a "bulge" or something else is acceptable during a professional encounter. This case wasn't one of them. But if it was, the LTCH is enough to stop further inquiry.

It wasn't one of them because of the restrictions within the seat belt law. I'm not "reading too much into that paragraph." There are multiple paragraphs about what this case is about: Fishing while enforcing the seat belt law. There is a tiny blurb about how all fishing (ie: Questioning, removal from vehicle, etc.) should stop once a LTCH is produced. Yet you want to say this means that any other incident, once LTCH produced, officers can't do anything further.

They're also saying that encounters outside of stops involving the seatbelt act that the LTCH is enough to stop inquiry into firearms.

No, they aren't. You want to believe they are, but they aren't. You want to take a snippet of a ruling and apply it to every possible situation that may arise. There are at least two cases where after a LTCH was produced, the LEOs did even more, yet the court didn't flip out claiming everything dealing with guns should have ceased immediately:
#1: Shaft Jones v. State of Indiana
#2: Melvin Washington v. State of Indiana

In both cases a LTCH was produced and ran through the computer. The court said nothing about how the officers had to cease anything dealing with the LTCH after it was produced.

Escalation beyond "normal" of course would merit something beyond just the LTCH inquiry.

There was no escalation beyond the normal, from what is stated in the cases, of those that I mentioned above.

Not every encounter will have that. If you pull me over for a burnt out headlight (or any other infraction not related to the seatbelt act), and I have a civil discussion with you, and you see my firearm, you can ask for my LTCH. When I provide it, the discussion is over. This scenario has nothing to do with the seatbelt act, and the INSC had this in mind when they wrote that paragraph.

I guess we shall see. The court said nothing in Washington about removing (in this case) you and placing you in handcuffs while I deal with the stop. It said nothing about taking and securing the handgun from the person in Jones. You want to ignore about 99% of a court ruling and focus solely upon a small blurb. Then you want to say that blurb applies to every single instance that could come about. I believe this is dangerous to people who might be reading, and could seriously harm them with arrest (ie: Resisting LE, interfering with LE, etc..). What you are typing here is your opinion. If your one of the justices that made that ruling, then admit it in public and put it in writing that the blurb about seeing a LTCH ceases everything. Of course maybe our disagreement is based in how we each define "the discussion is over?" What exactly do you mean by that? Do you mean an officer can't confiscate a weapon? Can't remove a person from a car? Can't run the license to check to see if it has been revoked?

You make my point for me.

I said all three were connected. I like how you again pick and choose which language to use to support you logic. You can't do that with court rulings. You must look at the entire ruling and everything discussed to know if it may apply to other actions that will be different. Once again, for the record, here are all three, and they can't be separated:
-Restrictions in seat belt enforcement act
-The guy wasn't a danger to the officer
-The showing of the license should have ceased further inquire, but this is especially the case given the restrictions placed on LE by the underlying law used to detain the man.

 

[ocsdor]

The OP (and others, especially :noobs should watch this:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yqMjMPlXzdA&list=FLMcHKFw2DkVIx-oOa9aFCng&index=8